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Lindsay: Florida's Estate Tax Laws--Apportionment Versus a Change Against

FLORIDA'S ESTATE TAX LAWS APPORTIONMENT VERSUS
A CHARGE AGAINST RESIDUE
ALAN LINDSAY*

During the period from June 13, 1949, to May 13, 1957, Florida
had an apportionment act distributing the burden of estate taxes
among all parties interested in the decedent's estate. On the latter date
this act was superseded by a statute charging estate taxes to residue in
the absence of testamentary direction to the contrary. Consideration
of the problems arising under the former act remains significant not
only because a great many estates subject to its provisions have not
yet ripened into final allocation of estate taxes but also because in
analyzing the superseding act it is desirable to determine whether the
changes are improvements or perhaps constitute a step backward. It
is the purpose of this article to analyze problems arising under both
laws and to compare the desirability of the results obtained.
THE

1949 ACT

APPORTIONING ESTATE TAX

The superseded apportionment act' was designed to accomplish
two primary purposes: (1) to distribute the burden of federal and
Florida estate taxes among all beneficiaries of the decedent, including
inter vivos donees, in the proportions that the interests received by
each could be said to have contributed to the production of the taxes,
and (2) to allocate deductions and exemptions allowed under the
taxing acts to the beneficiaries whose interests were subject thereto.
The act differed from pre-existing Florida law in four respects:
(1) It required contribution from recipients of nontestamentary assets that nevertheless produced estate tax, such as
tenancies by the entireties or gifts held to have been made
in contemplation of death.2
#A.B. 1949, LL.B. 1953, Harvard University; Member of New York and Palm

Beach, Florida, Bars.
'FLA.STAT. §734.041 (1949).
2The act provided in part: "Whenever it appears . . . that an executor . . .
has paid . .. a death tax . .. with respect to any property required to be included
in the gross estate . . . the amount of the tax so paid . . . shall be equitably pro-
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(2) It excused from contribution the recipients of interests
either initially exempt from tax or ultimately deductible. s
(3) It abrogated the common law hierarchy of immunity from
contribution to tax, whereby residuary legacies were exhausted before general, general before specific, and so
4
forth.
(4) It minimized federal estate tax by exonerating the share
of the surviving spouse from contribution to the tax to
the extent the share was subject to marital deduction. 5
The Florida apportionment act was by no means a novel statute.
Other states had similar statutes, most of which were modeled upon
section 124 of New York's Decedents' Estate Law, originally enacted
in 1930.6 Twenty-nine years of judicial experience with these various
acts has pointed up three general questions that may be expected to
arise under them; two other questions more or less peculiar to this
state may also arise by reason of Florida's dower and homestead laws.
These five problems, none of which has been resolved in Florida, are
as follows:
(1) In the event that a decedent's gross estate for tax purposes
includes realty in a foreign jurisdiction, should the domicile
attempt to apportion a share of estate tax to the recipients,
or should the apparently clear meaning of the apportionrated among the persons interested in the estate to whom such property is ...
For the purposes of this act the term 'persons interested in the
transferred ....
estate' shall mean ...

all persons who . . . receive ...

any property or interest

which is required to be included in the gross estate . . ..' See In re Fuchs'
Estate, 60 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1952). Prior to the passage of the act all taxes were
apparently payable from the testamentary estate; see FLA. STAT. §734.05 (1949). But
see Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So.2d 432, 435 (Fla. 1951) (dictum).
3See In re Fuchs' Estate, supra note 2. Prior to the act the benefits of such deductions were allocated to the entire estate. In re Bernay's Estate, 150 Fla. 414, 7

So.2d 444 (1942).
4This common law doctrine is codified in Florida by FLA. STAT. §734.05 (1957),
which has remained unchanged since before passage of the apportionment act.
Reference in the Hagerty and Fuchs cases to the existence of apportionment at
common law prior to adoption of the act would appear to be unfounded except
in connection with dower; cf. Wells v. Menn, 158 Fla. 228, 28 So.2d 881 (1946).
sE.g., since the marital deduction is reduced to the extent the surviving spouse's
otherwise deductible interests are subject to contribution to tax, freeing such interests from tax produces the maximum deduction and minimum tax.
6The text of this law is set forth at 37 A.L.R.2d 203, n.2 (1954).
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(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

ment act be whittled down in deference to the ancient
doctrine that all matters arising in connection with real
property should be governed by the law of the situs?
If the act should apply to taxes produced by foreign realty,
how could it be enforced if the courts of the situs did not
recognize its extraterritorial effect? This same enforcement problem arises in connection with inter vivos trusts
with a foreign situs that are included in the gross estate.
How are estate tax credits, such as those available for gift
or estate taxes previously paid, to be treated, in light of
the language of the act giving the benefits of exemptions
and deductions to the recipients of interests to which they
apply?
How is the tax attributable to dower to be computed in
the event that the total interests passing to the widow and
required to be included in the gross estate exceed the
7
marital deduction?
Is the tax produced by homestead property to be apportioned and, if so, how?
Apportionment of Taxes Allocable to Foreign Realty

Certainly the language of the apportionment act appears broad
enough to include taxes allocable to foreign realty.8 Aside from the
language, however, there is no definite indication as to how the
Florida courts might resolve this question. Case law in Florida prior
to enactment of the apportionment statute does not indicate that the
Florida Supreme Court has taken any position with respect to federal
estate tax produced by foreign realty,9 and there are no reported cases
under the act to settle the question.
The proponents of control by the law of the situs appear to derive
their position from the interaction of two old and sturdy precepts.
The first is the clearly established proposition that the federal estate
7An earlier problem in connection with dower under the version of the dower
statute, FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1957), in effect prior to 1951, was resolved In re Fuchs'
Estate, supra note 2.
8

See note 2 supra.

91n re Bernays' Estate, 150 Fla. 414, 7 So.2d 444 (1942), sometimes cited for
the proposition that Florida has aligned itself with those states holding that the
law of the domicile controls imposition of all federal estate taxes, appears to have

dealt only with property passing under Florida law.
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tax is a charge against the decedent's assets on the occasion of their
transfer by death, as opposed to a charge against the distributees by
reason of their receipt of the assets.' 0 The second is that all matters
pertaining to real property are exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the situs. The first precept produces an in rem concept of the'tax
which, when read with the second, dictates exclusive control by local
law.
Opposed to this conceptual position is the recognition implicit in
the apportionment act that the tax is ultimately a dollar and cents
burden upon the beneficiaries which, in the absence of testamentary
direction to the contrary, should be equitably distributed among them.
This, too, is an old and respectable concept, equitable apportionment
being "nothing more than the doctrine of equitable contributionitself but an application of the ancient maxim 'equality is equity.' ""
It is clear that if equitable apportionment of the entire estate tax burden is to be accomplished, all assets included in the gross estate must
be considered. Moreover, there is actually very little connection between local law and the distribution of the burden of estate tax, because the tax is not charged against any person or thing within the
jurisdiction of the situs of the foreign realty; it is an in personam
obligation of the domiciliary administration. True, the tax is based
upon the transfer of the asset and the transfer is controlled and defined by local law, but even this connection is one of expediencethe taxing act simply ignores local law where Congress did not approve of the results that would be obtained under it.12
For these reasons, the domiciliary apportionment of taxes allocable to foreign realty does not constitute an unwarranted interference
with or assumption of jurisdiction over the inheritance of foreign
realty, as might be the case were the domicile attempting to apportion a specific local law charge such as a real property tax. Accordingly, the statutory apportionment should apply without exception to
all assets included in the gross estate.
Cases in other jurisdictions hold both ways on this point. Massachusetts has refused to grant extraterritorial effect to the New York
IoYoung Men's Christian Ass'n v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
llWilmington Trust Co. v. Copeland, 33 Del. Ch. 399, 94 A.2d 703 (Orphans
Ct. 1953).
12E.g., the inclusion in gross estate of tenancies by the entireties, gifts in
contemplation of death, trusts in which decedent-settlor reserved a life- interest,
etc.
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apportionment statute in cases involving inter vivos trusts,13 and seems
to have reached the conclusion that apportionment acts - presumably including its own 14 -should be limited to apportionment of
taxes produced by assets within the jurisdiction of the domicile. New
York, on the other hand, has held its act to apply to taxes allocable
to foreign realty. 15
It is submitted that Florida should and probably would follow
New York. It is significant that (1) the New York case had been
decided at the time of the adoption of the Florida apportionment
act and was presumably adopted with it, and (2) the Florida Supreme Court has looked to the New York construction of this statute
on at least one occasion.16
Enforcement of Apportionment
Once apportionment of taxes with respect to foreign realty or
trusts has been ordered, additional problems may arise despite the
fact that the executor is authorized by the act to proceed in personam against the person in possession of the property rather than
against the asset itself, theoretically bypassing the question of domiciliary judicial control of foreign assets. Fortunately, such problems
should be rare. If the domiciliary personal representative has control
of other assets destined for the distributee, or if the foreign realty is
sold and the proceeds remitted to him, he can effect the apportionment. Similarly, if the distributee is a widow electing dower in
Florida, the domiciliary representative can bring this fact to the
attention of the county judge's court when dower is allotted and can
obtain an order permitting the retention of enough of the dower to
satisfy any contribution the widow may ultimately be required to
make toward estate tax."7 If the decedent owned realty in another
state, a widow electing dower in Florida must necessarily have elected
13See Warfield v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 147 N.E.2d 809 (Mass. 1958); Isaacson
v. Boston Safe Dep. & Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334 (1950).
14The Massachusetts apportionment act, MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 65A, §§5, 5A, was
amended in 1948, but the portions applicable to the Isaacson and Warfield cases remained identical in providing for apportionment of taxes produced by nontestamentary assets and are similar in import to those of the New York act, N.Y. DEcED.
EsT. LAW §124, under which the Adams case, infra note 15, was decided.
151n re Adams' Estate, 37 N.Y.2d 587 (Surf. Ct. 1940).
161n re Fuchs' Estate, 60 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
"vDacus v. Blackwell, 90 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1956).
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her statutory share in the foreign realty.18 There seems to be no
reason to doubt that any apportionment order based on the foreign
share may likewise be satisfied against the Florida dower.' 9 Even
if the personal representative cannot gain control over assets sufficient
to satisfy the apportionment order, he may yet obtain an in personam
judgment against the distributee which would be enforceable anywhere, provided jurisdictional requirements were met.
In the unusual case in which none of the above solutions is available to the personal representative and he is forced to proceed against
the distributee or ancillary administrator in the state where the realty
or trust is located, he may well come away empty-handed. Such was
the result in First National Bank of Miami v. First Trust Co. of St.
Paul,20 in which Minnesota denied extraterritorial effect to the Florida
apportionment act; similar results have been reached in other jurisdictions.21 There is little that can be done if this point is reached. If
the personal representative has any reason to anticipate such a situation, he should not distribute any estate assets to a foreign distributee
without first insuring that any apportionment that may be ordered
can be otherwise satisfied.
Allocation of CreditsAgainst Estate Tax
A third problem arises under all apportionment acts modeled on
the New York statute in allocating available credits on property
previously taxed, since the act itself allocates only exemptions and
deductions to the recipients of interests subject to them. This question
has been considered at length in an excellent article by Samuel L.
Payne.22 Two New York cases 23 cited in the article denied allocation
of credit to the beneficiary receiving the previously taxed property
and applied the credit to the total tax before apportionment. This
result is contrary to the implicit rationale of the apportionment act,
lsGriley v. Griley, 43 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1949), and authorities cited therein.
29See discussion under heading "Dower and the Estate Tax" infra.
20242 Minn. 226, 64 N.W.2d 524 (1954).
22E.g., see note 13 supra. As to which states recognize the propriety of domiciliary control of estate taxes allocable to foreign immovables, see Annot., 16
A.L.R.2d 1282 (1951).
22Apportionment of Federal and State Estate Taxes Under Florida Law, 11

MIAmI L.Q. 265, 267-68 (1956).
23
1n re Dommerich's Estate, 74 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Surr. Ct. 1945); In re Blumenthal's
Estate, 182 Misc. 137, 46 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
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namely, each beneficiary should pay only the share of the tax that
the interest he receives is deemed to have produced. The deficiency
24
may, of course, be cured by amendment, as was done in New York;
but in the absence of amendment the allocation of estate tax credits
remains in doubt.
It is by no means certain that Florida would follow the New York
decisions applying the credit to total tax before apportionment. Conceivably it might be found that in the event the act is deficient or ambiguous, the underlying policy of equitable apportionment - which
the legislature has stated to have been the law of Florida prior to the
act 25 - would either cover the question itself or compel a broad construction of exemptions and deductions. On the other hand, this
underlying policy was clearly not in evidence in 1942 when In re
Bernays' Estate,26 subjecting a tax deductible charitable bequest to

contribution, was decided.
Dower and the Estate Tax
If all assets passing to the widow are subject to the marital deduction, dower will bear no portion of the estate tax.2 7 But when all

such assets are not subject to the marital deduction, the dower statute
provides for contribution: "[Wlhere the dower interest of the widow
shall have the effect of increasing the estate tax, her dower shall be
ratably liable with the remainder of the estate ....
."28
This language
raises two questions:
(1) Is it necessary that the election to take dower -as compared with acceptance of the provisions of the will - increase the estate tax before dower is liable to contribution,
or merely that if all assets passing to the widow exceed the
marital deduction and therefore produce tax, dower must
bear its ratable share?
(2) If dower is subject to contribution to estate tax, is it
"ratably liable with the remainder of the estate" in toto,
or merely to the extent that the widow's interests exceed
the available marital deduction?
24N.Y. DEcED. ESr. LAW §124 (3)(iii) (1950).

25F1a. Laws 1949, ch. 25435 §5.
26150 Fla. 414, 7 So.2d 444 (1942).
271n re Fuchs' Estate, 60 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
28FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1957).
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These questions were discussed at length in an article appearing
in The Florida Bar Journal in 1957.29 Its author concluded that
while the language of the statute is misleading, the legislative intent
is manifest that dower bear such a portion of the tax as the portion
of all assets passing to the widow and not subject to the marital deduction bears to all assets included in the taxable estate. As he pointed
out, the rationale of In re Fuchs' Estate,30 the dissenting opinion-' of
Colclazier v. Colclazier2 and the clear language of the apportionment
act, with which the dower statute is in pari materia, all support this
reasoning. Nothing has occurred since the publication of the article
to sustain or refute the conclusions reached. If the question does arise,
however, it is submitted that it will be decided in accord with those
conclusions.
Homestead and the Estate Tax
The apportionment act provided, in part:
"[E]xcept that in cases where a trust is created, or other provision made whereby any person is given an interest in income,
or an estate for years, or for life, or other temporary interest in
any property or fund, the tax on both such temporary interest
and on the remainder thereafter shall be charged against and
paid out of the corpus of such property or fund without apportionment between remainders and temporary estates."
This provision was taken verbatim from the New York statute,
but there is no homestead in New York. The provision is seemingly
applicable to homestead in Florida in the common case in which
homestead property passes as a life estate to the widow with the remainder to the decedent's lineal descendants. Obviously estate tax
is produced by homestead here, since the marital deduction is not
available for terminable interests. But homestead is "exempt from
forced sale under process of any court ... [except that] no property
shall be exempt from sale for taxes,"3 3 and this exemption "shall
3
inure to the widow and heirs." 4
29Legal Questions Under Florida Apportionment Statute, 31 FLA. BJ. 190, 193.
3060 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1952).

SiDiffering from the majority on another point.
2289 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1956).
33FLA. CONSr. art. X, §1.
341d. §2.
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At the outset, it seems that the exception for taxes would not
apply to the charge against corpus referred to in the apportionment
act. The charge contemplated by the act is not actually a tax, but
merely a statutably imposed obligation to relieve others from a disproportionate and inequitable share of the burden of estate taxes.
This conclusion appears inescapable when it is considered that the
courts can be expected to give the taxes exception a narrow construction, applying it only to taxes assessed directly against the homestead.35
If the charge against corpus referred to in the apportionment act
is not to be enforced against the homestead, the courts are left with
several alternatives. They may decide that the "other provision made"
language of the apportionment act refers to an act of the decedent,
whereas homestead arises by operation of law, and may therefore condude that the quoted provision of the act was never intended to apply
to homestead. Or they may arrive at the same result simply by finding
that, because of the constitutional exemption, the language cannot
apply to homestead irrespective of legislative intent. In either event,
apportionment could nevertheless be ordered out of any nonhomestead assets the widow and heirs had or were to receive. Aside from
selecting some appropriate actuarial method to evaluate the shares of
the widow and heirs, no problems would seem to be created by such
an order.
On the other hand, the courts could simply conclude that the apportionment act has no bearing on homestead at all; this interpretation would result in an apportionment of tax based only on other
assets. This solution seems contrary to the intent of the act, and it
provides no compensating advantages. It is not the purpose of the
homestead exemption from forced sale that the widow and heirs shall
receive homestead property intact in addition to what they may otherwise have or receive, but rather that homestead shall be a specific and
irreducible minimum that they may keep in any event. 36 Accordingly,
there seems to be no reason why they should not contribute to the
tax allocable to homestead from other available assets.
3
sSee the opinion of the lower court in Florida Ind. Comm'n v. Coleman, 154
Fla. 744, 18 So.2d 905 (1944); see also Lafayette Bldg. Ass'n v. Spofford, 221 La.
549, 59 So.2d 880 (1952), so construing a similar provision of the Louisiana
constitution.
3Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603, 136 So. 353 (1931); see discussion
of the purpose of the homestead exemption in Crosby and Miller, Our Legal
Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption: I-I1, 2 U. FLA. L. REv. 12, 13-15
(1949).
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Recapitulationof Apportionment Problems
If the Florida Supreme Court is ever called upon to decide the
matter,37 it will probably hold that full-scale apportionment against
all assets includible in the federal gross estate is directed by the
Florida act. Only in rare cases would this full-scale apportionment be
frustrated, and then only to the extent of assets situated in a foreign
jurisdiction. Tax credits may or may not be allocable to the beneficiaries receiving the property previously taxed, but, if not, a simple
amendment could cure this deficiency if the act should be readopted.
The problems arising by reason of Florida's dower and homestead
laws, while presenting the courts with certain technical difficulties,
are largely illusory; they could be easily disposed of in a fashion
effectively accomplishing the universal apportionment contemplated
by the act and, in the event of re-enactment, could be provided for
specifically.

THE 1957 Acr CHARGING ESTATE TAX TO REsmuE
On May 13, 1957, without previous warning to the bar in general,
the apportionment act was summarily scrapped and an entirely new
version of section 734.041 of the Florida statutes was enacted. This
version directs that all estate taxes be charged to residue in the
absence of a testamentary direction to the contrary. Thus, when no
such direction appears, the new act not only does away with granting
to the beneficiaries of tax deductible assets the benefits of the deductions but also exonerates the recipients of nontestamentary assets
from a share in the tax, contrary to the underlying policy of equitable
apportionment previously recognized by both the legislature3s and
the courts.3 9 A number of serious problems are presented by the new
statute:
(1) It is not clear whether the residue to which all estate taxes
are now to be charged includes residuary foreign realty
and, if so, how charges against it are to be enforced.
37There are still many estates in probate subject to the apportionment act, which
applies to estates of decedents dying prior to May 13, 1957.
SFla. Laws 1949, ch. 25435, §5.
39Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1951). But see In re Ruperti's Estate,
86 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Surr. Ct. 1949), in which a New York court construed the preapportionment act law of Florida as not requiring such apportionment.
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(2) If the residue does include foreign realty, is the widow's
foreign statutory share in such realty subject to contribution to estate tax?
(3) It is apparent that the new act is in direct conflict with the
dower statute.
(4) In many cases the new act will increase the over-all estate
tax.
(5) Most significantly, many situations will arise in which the
new act cannot help but frustrate the testator's dispositive scheme - despite the fact that the sole justification for
a primary charge against residue, and therefore the only
apparent reason for the new act, is the assumption that
had the testator considered the matter such would have
been his choice.
The problems set forth above may arise in situations in which
the testator has failed effectively to provide how estate taxes shall be
borne, so that the statutory requirement of a charge against residue
comes into play. Another problem of perhaps even more serious proportions can arise even when a testamentary direction is present and
the new act is consequently rendered inapplicable ab initio by its
own terms:
(6) Will a testamentary direction to apportion taxes to nontestamentary assets be effective?
Charging Tax to Residuary Foreign Realty
Unless residuary foreign realty is sold and the proceeds transmitted to the domiciliary personal representative, it is likely that
neither the realty nor its recipient will ever be chargeable with a
portion of the tax. It is clear that no Florida court has jurisdiction
to charge or to entertain a proceeding against the foreign realty
itself. 40 Moreover, even if the foreign devisee were before a Florida
court, or other assets passing to him were under its control, he would
still probably escape sharing in any tax attributable to the foreign
realty. The reason for this is that in order to hold the recipient or
his other assets liable, it is necessary to proceed against him in per40See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203 P.2d 1078

(1949).
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sonam; and it appears not only that no such action is authorized by
the new statute but that its passage, in fact, precludes such an action.
This conclusion is based on a number of considerations. The
new statute will probably be characterized as a return to common
law principles.4 At common law, estate taxes were considered merely
a form of administration expense,42 payable by the domiciliary personal representative out of that portion of the residue to which he
took tifle.43 The common law did not concern itself with inequality
between foreign and domiciliary legatees. Even if the common law in
Florida prior to the 1949 act included the doctrine of equitable ap44
portionment, so that the act was merely declaratory of existing law,
repeal of that act compromises the validity of the doctrine in any
form. Moreover, the new residuary act provides for collecting the
tax by a charge against assets rather than people, and the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius indicates that no other method
of collection is available. It would therefore appear that the legislature did not intend that residuary foreign realty not converted into
cash and remitted to the domicile should contribute to the tax - otherwise it would not by implication have denied the personal representative an in personam remedy against the foreign devisee that could in
most instances be locally enforced, leaving him with nothing but an
in rem action in the foreign jurisdiction.
Widow's Statutory Share in ForeignRealty
In the unlikely event that Florida attempts to charge a portion of
estate tax to foreign residuary realty, or if the proceeds of the sale of
foreign realty come into the hands of the domiciliary personal representative, a special problem arises in determining whether the widow's
statutory share is residuary in nature and, if so, whether it should
bear a portion of the tax. Whether it is residuary depends, of course,
on the law of the situs. In the common event that the widow's share
is a fraction of the net estate, it would probably be treated as residuary and a portion of the tax charged to it. There has been at least
4Amendment of the Massachusetts apportionment act to provide for the charge
to residue of all estate taxes produced by the testamentary estate was held to be
a return to common law principles in Weingartner v. North Wales, 327 Mass. 731,

101 N.E.2d 132 (1951).
42Corbin v. Townshend, 92 Conn. 501, 103 Ad. 647 (1918).
43Hepburn v. Winthrop, 83 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1936).

"See notes 25, 39 supra.
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one case, however, holding that if such a share were subject to the
marital deduction, it would not contribute to tax despite the fact that
taxes were primarily payable out of the residue. 45 In that case the
court determined that the primary charge to residue applied only
to testamentary assets and accordingly held itself free to apportion
the tax with respect to nontestamentary assets, among which it
classified the widow's statutory share. This holding was rejected in
a later case, however, the same court concluding that the very fact
that the statutory share was a portion of the net rather than the
gross estate indicated a legislative directive that it should share in
46
the estate tax.

Dower
It seems, for three reasons, that dower should not be required to
contribute to the estate tax under the new act to the extent that it
is subject to the marital deduction. First, dower is intrinsically not
47
residuary in nature, being more akin to a charge against the estate.
Second, a classification of dower as residue within the meaning of
section 734.041 of Florida Statutes 1957 would be both illogical and
contrary to the protective policy that created the right. The underlying reason for charging estate tax to residue at common law -and
accordingly the probable basis for the present statute - is the assumption that such an allocation is most likely to accord with the testator's unexpressed intent. Dower, on the other hand, is a creature of
statute, a right given the widow in derogation of the testator's intent
and designed to protect her from his neglect. If dower were held to
be residue, it would enable a wealthy testator, simply by phrasing his
will in terms of general legacies rather than residuary bequests, to
deplete or exhaust the widow's interest by causing it to bear the entire burden of estate tax. Third, the dower statute directs that when
dower increases estate tax it shall contribute to it; the application of
ordinary rules of construction to this language would indicate that
when dower is subject to the marital deduction and does not produce estate tax, it shall not be subject to contribution.
If the widow's total interests in the gross estate exceed the avail45Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952).
46Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954).
47See the argument of the widow in Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So.
856 (1936).
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able marital deduction, the dower statute and the 1957 act cannot
be readily harmonized and the result is uncertain. If dower is not
residuary, how, under the new act, can it ever be liable for any
portion of the tax as directed by the dower statute as long as there
is in fact sufficient residue to pay the tax? Either the estate tax provision of the dower statute, which was added in 1951 to make that
statute consistent with the 1949 apportionment act, must have been
repealed to some extent by adoption of the present version of section
734.041, or else the new act is simply not applicable to a dower situation in which total interests passing to the widow exceed the available marital deduction. While the former alternative appears technically the more probable,48 there are strong arguments against it,
namely: (1) complete exoneration of dower from contribution to
estate tax can produce a situation in which the entire testamentary
estate is exhausted in payment of taxes attributable to the widow's
interests while she pays nothing; and (2) if there is any area in
Florida jurisprudence in which the doctrine of equitable apportionment is well established, it is in connection with dower.49
Estate Tax
In at least three instances the new act will serve to increase overall estate tax. The first is when the bequest to the surviving spouse
is expressed in residuary terms, so that his or her share is specifically
chargeable with a portion of estate tax. The second is when the surviving spouse takes a statutory share in foreign realty, the share is
measured in residual terms, the realty is sold, and the proceeds are
transmitted to the domiciliary personal representative or otherwise
become subject to a charge for estate taxes.50 The third is in the
event of intestacy when there is a surviving spouse.
In each of these three situations the share of the surviving spouse
will be subject to a charge for a portion of the estate tax, thus reducing the marital deduction, increasing the tax, and incidentally
48sJust such an implicit repeal of the previous dower statute was held to have
been effected by passage of the apportionment act; see In re Fuchs' Estate, 60 So.2d
536 (Fla. 1952).
49Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
5oIn the unlikely event that the Court should apply the doctrine of Miller v.
Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952), no increase in estate tax would
be produced under the new act in connection with the widow's statutory share
if entirely subject to the marital deduction.
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precipitating the series of calculations produced by the interaction of
decreasing marital deduction, increasing over-all tax, resulting increase in spouse's contribution, resulting further reduction of marital
deduction, and so forth.5 1 Of the three, the increase in tax brought
about by the surviving spouse's election to take a statutory share in
foreign realty is in one sense the most serious, since no act of the
testator can avoid it. Even if he directed in his will that taxes be
paid out of specific assets not passing to his widow, she cannot take
advantage of this provision when taking against the will. 52
All three of these situations were, of course, provided for under
the 1949 apportionment act, since, to the extent subject to the marital
deduction, the share of the surviving spouse was free of liability for
estate tax.
Destructionof Dispositive Scheme
The theoretical basis for charging estate tax to the residue is a
part of the larger common law concept that all debts and expenses
must be borne by it - in itself no more than recognition of the meaning of the word residue and so an effectuation of the testator's intent.
In the early days of estate taxation, few distinctions were drawn between estate taxes and other charges. 53 But there is a vast difference
between charging debts and ordinary probate expenses to the residue - or, more accurately, simply measuring residue as what is left
after their payment - and charging estate taxes produced by nontestamentary assets to the residue. In the first instance, such a charge
merely effectuates the testator's intent implicit in his use of residuary
terms; in the second, the result is to charge a transfer tax the testator
probably never envisioned - if he had, he would have provided for
its payment - against beneficiaries who may not have received that
transfer. It does not follow from the fact that the testator must have
desired that the residuary beneficiaries bear the first kind of expense
that he would have wished them also to bear the second. Unless such
an inference is not merely possible but necessary, ordinary tenets of
51For the practical effect of this interaction of the spouse's tax contribution
and the marital deduction, see example under heading "Destruction of Dispositive
Scheme" infra, in which a "first trial" marital deduction of $925,000 is ultimately
reduced to nothing.
52Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936).
53See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 169, 177-80 (1954).
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equitable contribution require imposition of the tax burden upon the
54
recipients of the interests producing it.
The lack of justification for
this inference in many cases and the disastrous results it can produce
may best be illustrated by the following example:
H is married and has three sons; the bulk of his estate is in a
family business worth $4,000,OPO. Two of his sons reach maturity; H takes them into his business and gives each a
$1,000,000 interest, paying the gift tax. In his will H provides for an equal interest to his third son on reaching maturity, with the residue to his widow. He dies within three
years of the first gift. Both gifts are held to have been made in
contemplation of death.
Estate tax calculation produces the following results:
If the widow takes under the will
Gross estate
Ultimate marital deductions5
Funeral, administration
expenses, etc.
Specific exemption
Total deductions

$4,000,000
-0$75,000
60,000

Taxable estate
Gross etstate tax
Credit gift tax6
Net estate tax
Third son's share
Widow's share
Share of first two sons (each)

195,000
$3,865,000
1,758,550
552,750
$1,205,800
719,200
-01,000,000

54See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Copeland, 33 Del. Ch. 399, 94 A.2d 703 (Orphans

Ct. 1953).
55"First trial" marital deduction is $925,000. This calculation of ultimate
available marital deduction from that is lengthy and has been omitted.
56Gift tax was calculated on the basis that these were the testator's only gifts
to his elder sons during the years in question and that his lifetime exemption,
previously unused, was exhausted. The gifts were not split, however.
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If the widow takes dower57
Gross estate
Marital deduction
Funeral, administration
expenses, etc.
Specific exemption
Total deductions

$4,000,000
$666,666
75,000
60,000
801,666
$3,198,333
1,374,266
552,750

Taxable estate
Gross estate tax
Credit gift tax
Net estate tax
Third son's share
Widow's share
Share of first two sons (each)

$ 821,516
436,816
666,666
1,000,000

Under the 1949 apportionmentact5 s
Gross estate
Marital deduction
Funeral, administration
expenses, etc.
Specific exemption
Total deductions

$4,000,000
$925,000
75,000
60,000

Taxable estate
Gross estate tax
Credit for gift taxes
Net estate tax (each son contributes
$226,216.66)
Widow's share
Share of three sons (each)

1,060,000
$2,940,000
1,231,400
552,750
$678,650
925,000
773,783

It is apparent in the above example that the testator intended
that his sons should share equally in his estate. Without statutory
apportionment of taxes to nontestamentary assets, however, this in57Obviously the widow will take dower, since she receives nothing under the

will.

58Assuming that the credit for gift taxes paid was allocable to the estate in

general.
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ferential intent will almost certainly be defeated; there is very little
chance that such an inference will be held to constitute the unequivocal sort of testamentary direction necessary to overcome the statutory charge to residue. 59 Thus in the first instance the third son will
take $719,200, the widow nothing; and the over-all estate tax will be
$527,150 higher than under apportionment. In the second instance which will surely result if the widow is apprised of her rights - the
third son will receive $436,816, which is less than one half the share
received by each of his brothers; the widow will receive $666,666; and
the estate tax will still be $142,866 higher than if apportionment were
effected.
This example is perhaps extreme, but the problems it presents
are not unusual. Were the testator in the example to die intestate,
or were his will to be invalidated, application of the doctrine of advancements and the widow's ensuing election to take dower would
result in a very similar situation. If the gifts to the elder sons were
held not to be advancements, it is evident that the third son would
take even less.
Many other instances can be imagined giving rise to similar
problems, such as the creation of a tenancy by the entirety or a
joint tenancy, creation of an inter vivos trust later held to be revocable
or otherwise taking effect on the settlor's death, and so forth. In fact,
in every case in which substantial nontestamentary assets are included in the gross estate and the testator makes no effective provision for the payment of taxes produced by them, it seems that the
only inference that may safely be drawn is that the testator did not
intend the residue to bear those taxes. In such situations it is the
height of injustice to single out and saddle the residuary estate which is in most instances the portion of the estate passing to the
primary objects of the testator's bounty - with the entire burden of
the taxes.
This point has been recognized in other jurisdictions. Perhaps
the most interesting example is Massachusetts, which, like Florida,
had an apportionment statute and subsequently abandoned it in
favor of charging estate taxes to residue. But Massachusetts did not
return to the common law concept entirely; it specifically retained
apportionment in connection with nontestamentary assets, thus
avoiding the situation illustrated above.60
59See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 1216, 1224 (1951).
egoSee discussion of the Massachusetts statute, note 14 supra.
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A second anomaly in the new act lies in the fact that although it
seems to comport with the testator's probable intent in charging
taxes attributable to testamentary assets to residue, even here it may
be partially self-defeating. If, as discussed above, taxes attributable
to residuary foreign realty may not be charged against it, the assumed intent is necessarily defeated pro tanto. Certainly if the testator wanted taxes charged to residue, he would not wish to exonerate
a portion merely by reason of its location.
Testamentary Apportionment of Estate Tax
to Nontestamentary Assets
In the event that a testator anticipates that an inter vivos gift or
gifts may ultimately be included in his gross estate for federal tax
purposes, the new act appears to grant him the right to direct apportionment of a share of the tax to that gift: "Nothing in this
statute shall prohibit a testator from directing in his will that said
taxes be apportioned or paid in a manner other than as provided in
this section."
It appears that if the testator in the example given in the preceding section anticipated the devastation the new act would effect,
he could still save the situation by a testamentary direction that if
inter vivos gifts were included in his gross estate the donees should
bear their proportionate share of estate tax - or could he?
The new act throws the burden of estate taxes on residue unless
the testator provides otherwise; it is thus a codification of common
law. 61 Cases arising under the common law rule have reached oppo-

site conclusions as to the testator's power to charge by a provision in
his will a portion of estate taxes to assets he neither owned nor con62
trolled at his death. Two such cases are United States v. Goodson
and Warfield v. Merchants National Bank. 63 Both arose in jurisdictions where the common law rule, as now codified in Florida, was
applicable - the Goodson case by reason of the fact that the domicile, Minnesota, subscribed to the common law rule, the Warfield
case by reason of the fact that neither the New York nor the Massachusetts apportionment statutes were applicable to the estate of a
nonresident decedent in the forum, Massachusetts, so that the court
6GWeingartner v. North Wales, 327 Mass. 731, 101 N.E.2d 132 (1951); see Annot.,
37 A.L.R.2d 176 (1954).
62253 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1958).
63147 N.E.2d 809 (Mass. 1958).
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was compelled to fall back on the common law. The Goodson case
dealt only with jointly held property and inter vivos trusts included
in the testator's gross estate for federal tax purposes, but it may
fairly be stated to stand for the rule that even without statutory
apportionment a testator may by will direct apportionment of estate
tax to nontestamentary property he disposed of prior to his death.
In the Warfield case a testamentary direction to apportion estate tax
to an inter vivos trust included in the gross estate was held ineffective because the direction did not amend the trust in the way
provided by the trust instrument. The rationale of this case appears
to be that a testator in his will can charge taxes to an inter vivos
transfer only to the extent that he has retained control over the
transferred asset; therefore it appears that in Massachusetts, in cases
in which its apportionment act is inapplicable, substantially all
testamentary attempts to apportion taxes to nontestamentary assets
will fail.
There is no certainty as to which case Florida will follow; the
result in the Goodson case, while more desirable, appears somewhat
violative of ordinary property concepts in permitting an inter vivos
donor to recapture a portion of his gift ex post facto for the payment
of estate tax. In any event, however, it is significant that in the
Goodson case the litigation was against the United States Treasury
Department, so until the matter is settled in Florida a testator attempting testamentary apportionment of estate tax to inter vivos
transfers can anticipate an interested third party to the problem who
will not be content with an amicable settlement among the beneficiaries.
Recapitulationof the Problems of the New Act
It is probable that the 1957 act is not applicable to residuary
foreign realty or to a surviving spouse's statutory share in foreign
realty even if residuary in nature. It is thus partially self-defeating
in that it denies complete effect to its own implicit rationale that
the testator intended residuary interests to share equally in the burden of tax. The new act is, moreover, in conflict with the existing
dower statute, and its application is obscure in instances in which
the widow elects dower and total interests passing to her exceed
the available marital deduction. Furthermore, the new act will result in more over-all estate tax in many instances and, in failing to
provide for contribution to tax from nontestamentary assets, can result in situations largely destructive of the testator's dispositive scheme.
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Finally, there is no certainty that even if the testator exercises his
apparent option to apportion estate taxes to nontestamentary assets,
the attempted apportionment will be effective; in any event, the
Treasury can be expected to require or itself institute real litigation
on this point.
RECOMMENDATIONS

There is nothing intrinsically wrong with charging estate taxes
to residue; in so far as taxes produced by the testamentary estate are
concerned, it seems probable that such a charge would conform to
the testator's wishes had he considered the problem. But in making
such a charge the legislature is throwing the entire burden of tax
on one class of beneficiaries, contrary to the maxim equality in equity.
Obviously, such unequal distribution should not be directed unless
there are solid grounds for assuming that the testator would have so
wished. And it seems extremely doubtful that the testator would have
so wished in situations in which a substantial portion of tax is produced by nontestamentary assets. Therefore, either the 1949 apportionment act should be readopted with specific provisions as to the
doubtful aspects discussed above, or else the new residue act should
be amended so as to
(1) apply only to taxes produced by testamentary assets;
(2) reinstate apportionment as to nontestamentary assets, as
now is the case in Massachusetts following its abandonment of full scale apportionment;
(3) apply to residuary foreign realty or a surviving spouse's
statutory share in foreign realty if residual in nature, the
domiciliary personal representative being empowered to
proceed in personam against the recipients of the property
in order to effectuate such a charge.
Finally, serious consideration should be given the fact that in the
event of intestacy, or if the will is so drawn as to define the share of
the surviving spouse in residuary terms, over-all estate tax will be
increased unless allowances are made for any deductions granted by
the taxing act. It seems doubtful whether the testator's - or inunexpressed intent that residuary beneficiaries
testate's -probable
share the tax burden equally is any stronger than his certain unexpressed intent that estate taxes be minimized.
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